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Perceptual Presence in the Kuhnian-
Popperian Bayesian Brain
A Commentary on Anil K. Seth
Wanja Wiese
Anil Seth’s target paper connects the framework of PP (predictive processing) and
the FEP (free-energy principle) to cybernetic principles. Exploiting an analogy to
theory of science, Seth draws a distinction between three types of active infer-
ence. The first type involves confirmatory hypothesis-testing. The other types in-
volve seeking disconfirming and disambiguating evidence, respectively. Further-
more,  Seth applies PP to various fascinating phenomena, including perceptual
presence. In this commentary, I explore how far we can take the analogy between
explanation in perception and explanation in science.
In the first part, I draw a slightly broader analogy between PP and con-
cepts in theory of science, by asking whether the Bayesian brain is Kuhnian or
Popperian. While many aspects of PP are in line with Karl Popper’s falsification-
ism, other aspects of PP conform to how Thomas Kuhn described scientific revolu-
tions. Thus, there is both a sense in which the Bayesian brain is Kuhnian, and a
sense in which it is Popperian. The upshot of these considerations is that falsific-
ation in PP can take many different forms. In particular, active inference can be
used to falsify a model in more ways than identified by Seth. 
In the second part of this commentary, I focus on Seth’s PPSMCT (predict-
ive processing account of sensorimotor contingency theory) and its application to
perceptual presence, which assigns a crucial role to counterfactual richness. In my
discussion, I  question the significance of counterfactual richness for perceptual
presence. First, I highlight an ambiguity inherent in Seth’s descriptions of the tar-
get phenomenon (perceptual presence vs. objecthood). Then I suggest that coun-
terfactual richness may not be the crucial underlying feature (of either perceptual
presence or objecthood). Giving a series of examples, I argue that the degree of
represented causal integration  is an equally good candidate for accounting for
perceptual presence (or objecthood), although more work needs to be done.
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1 Introduction
One of the relevant aspects of Seth’s discussion
is  the  way  in  which  it  highlights  interesting
links to theoretical precursors of PP. In doing
so, he broadens the historical context in which
the  framework  is  usually  situated.  However,
these considerations are not just relevant for the
history of science, they also constitute a theor-
etical  underpinning  of  several  ways  in  which
Seth  has  recently  developed  PP  accounts  of
various phenomena. Due to limited space, I can
only address some of these here. In particular, I
will focus on his three interpretations of active
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inference, and on his PP account of perceptual
presence. In so doing, I will also try to take the
analogy between explanation in perception and
explanation  in  science  a  little  further  than it
has previously been taken. 
In  section  2,  I  will  briefly  summarize
Seth’s view on the connection between cyber-
netics and the free-energy principle. One of the
results of his considerations is that a distinction
can be drawn between three types of active in-
ference. The first type involves confirmatory hy-
pothesis-testing. The other types involve seeking
disconfirming and disambiguating evidence, re-
spectively. Seth does not say much about what
it takes to disconfirm or falsify a hypothesis or
model. Furthermore, he seems to suggest that
not all types of active inference he distinguishes
are currently part of PP (at least in the version
described  by  Karl  Friston’s  FEP):  “[t]hese
points represent significant developments of the
basic infrastructure of PP” (Seth 2014, p. 3).1
In section  3, I will provide clarification of the
notion of falsification by referring to the works
of  Karl  Popper,  Imre  Lakatos,  and  Thomas
Kuhn. I will also provide examples to show that
different types of falsification are part and par-
cel of PP, not extensions of the basic infrastruc-
ture. In section  4, I point out an ambiguity in
Seth’s account of perceptual presence (percep-
tual presence vs. objecthood). After this, I sug-
gest that counterfactual richness may not be the
crucial underlying feature (of either perceptual
presence or objecthood). Giving a series of ex-
amples, I argue that the degree of  represented
causal integration is an equally good candidate
for accounting for perceptual presence (or ob-
jecthood),  although  more  work  needs  to  be
done.
2 Cybernetics and the free-energy 
principle
In his very rich target paper, Anil Seth calls at-
tention to one of the less well-considered pre-
cursors of PP: cybernetics. A central concept of
cybernetics is the notion of homeostasis, which
denotes an equilibrium of the system’s paramet-
1 Unless stated otherwise, all page numbers refer to the target paper
by Anil Seth.
ers. This equilibrium is maintained by keeping
the  system’s  essential  variables,  like  levels  of
blood oxygenation or blood sugar (cf. Seth this
collection, p. 7), within a certain range (cf. ibid.
pp. 7-8.). The process of achieving homeostasis
is  called  allostasis  (cf.  ibid. p.  8).  Cybernetic
systems are teleological, i.e.,  goal-directed, be-
cause they are always trying to reach and pre-
serve homeostasis. This suggests that control is
more important than perception (cf. ibid. p. 9),
and,  as  Seth  emphasizes,  it  prioritizes  intero-
ceptive  control  over  exteroceptive  control:  the
main goal  is  to  control  the system’s  essential
variables; interaction with the world is only ne-
cessary to the extent that it affects these vari-
ables (ibid. pp. 9-10.).
The principles of cybernetics fit astonish-
ingly  well  to  ideas  motivating  Karl  Friston’s
FEP (which can, in some respects, be seen as a
generalization  of  predictive  processing).2 The
fundamental assumption behind this principle is
that biological systems seek to “maintain their
states and form in the face of a constantly chan-
ging environment” (Friston 2010, p. 127). This
is  obviously  similar  to  the  goal  of  achieving
homeostasis.3 Another focus of FEP is active in-
ference, because action can reduce the surprisal
of the agent’s states (which is necessary to “res-
ist  a  tendency  to  disorder”,  Friston 2009,  p.
293); perceptual inference can only reduce the
free-energy bound on surprise (Friston 2009, p.
294). This is in stark contrast with the Helm-
holtzian roots of PP, according to which action
is primarily in the service of perception:
[...] wir beobachten unter fortdauernder ei-
gener  Thätigkeit,  und  gelangen  dadurch
zur Kenntniss des Bestehens eines gesetz-
lichen  Verhältnisses  zwischen unseren In-
nervationen  und  dem  Präsentwerden  der
verschiedenen  Eindrücke  aus  dem  Kreise
2 It is more general, because predictive processing only plays a role in it if
combined with the Laplace approximation (which entails, roughly, that
probability distributions are approximated by Gaussian distributions).
This approximation, however, also turns FEP into a more specific ver-
sion, by assuming that the brain codes probability distribution as Gaus-
sian distributions (which is not entailed by the general predictive pro-
cessing framework discussed in Clark 2013, for instance).
3 In fact, the free-energy principle seems to be partly inspired by cy-
bernetic  ideas.  Friston (2010,  p.  127),  for  instance,  cites  Ashby
(1947) when explaining the motivation for FEP.
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der  zeitweiligen  Präsentabilien.  Jede  un-
serer  willkührlichen  Bewegungen,  durch
die wir die Erscheinungsweise der Objecte
abändern,  ist  als  ein  Experiment  zu  be-
trachten, durch welches wir prüfen, ob wir
das gesetzliche Verhalten der vorliegenden
Erscheinung,  d.h. ihr  vorausgesetztes  Be-
stehen  in  bestimmter  Raumordnung,
richtig aufgefasst haben.4 (Helmholtz 1959,
p. 39) 
According to this view, the main target of ac-
tion is to find confirmatory evidence for intern-
ally-generated hypotheses. In short, the contrast
between these  two views  can be  described  as
“action as hypothesis-testing” versus “action as
predictive control”. Whereas the first seems to
fit best to the Helmholtzian roots of PP (and
puts  action  in  the  service  of  perception),  the
second seems to fit better to its cybernetic ori-
gins.  Most  notably,  the  free-energy  principle
combines  both  aspects,  but  assigns  a  pivotal
role to action (perceptual inference only makes
the free-energy bound on surprise tight, active
inference leads to a further reduction of free en-
ergy, reducing surprise implicitly).
Seth compares model selection and optim-
ization  in  evolutionary  robotics  to  how  these
processes  are  implemented  in  active  inference
(pp. 14-15.). He cites the famous starfish robot
developed by  Josh Bongard,  Victor Zykov,  &
Hod Lipson (2006)  as  an  example.  In  a  first
phase, the robot generates multiple competing
models of its own morphology and performs ac-
tions  for  which  these  models  predict  different
sensory  feedback.  By  comparing  these  predic-
tions  to  the  actual  feedback,  the  starfish  can
thus exclude some of the possible models. When
the robot has eliminated all but one model, a
second phase starts and it uses this model to
control its body and generate walking behavior
(action as  predictive  control).  Crucially,  when
the robot’s morphology changes (when an ex-
4 “[...]  we observe under constant own activity, and thereby achieve
knowledge of the existence of a lawful relation between our innerva-
tions and the presence of different impressions of temporary present-
ations [Präsentabilien]. All of our willful movements through which
we change the appearance of things should be considered an experi-
ment, through which we test whether we have grasped correctly the
lawful behavior of the appearance at hand, i.e. its supposed existence
in determinate spatial structures.” (My translation)
perimenter  removes  one  of  its  limbs),  it  can
switch back to the first phase, re-creating com-
peting  models  and  using  action  to  eliminate
most of them (action as hypothesis-testing).
Seth points out that the second phase, in
which the robot walks around, suggests that the
main purpose of predictive models is to control
behavior  effectively,  regardless  of  how  accur-
ately it  represents  the  world  or  the body (p.
15). In the first phase, by contrast, exploratory
actions are conducted in order to learn some-
thing about the body, not to reach a goal in-
volving its environment (ibid.). As noted above,
such instances of action conform more to Helm-
holtzian than to cybernetic roots (action as hy-
pothesis-testing).
What this shows is that action can fulfill
different  purposes—not  just  theoretically,  but
also in real applications. The robot starfish uses
action in at least two ways. Drawing on the of-
ten-noted  analogy  between  PP  and  scientific
practice (cf.  Gregory 1980), Seth explores fur-
ther purposes of action. This leads to a distinc-
tion between three types of active inference (pp.
18f.). The first involves active sampling to con-
firm predictions  derived  from currently  active
models; the second is employed to seek evidence
that  would  disconfirm  currently  held  hypo-
theses; the third involves sampling in order to
disambiguate  between  alternative  hypotheses
(p. 19).
Crucially,  Seth  does  not  elaborate  much
on the notion of falsification or disconfirmation.
He relates disconfirmation to Bayesian surprise
(which formalizes the extent to which new evid-
ence leads to a revision of prior representations,
cf.  Baldi &  Itti 2010). Accordingly, he charac-
terizes  seeking  falsifying  evidence  in  terms  of
maximizing Bayesian surprise. However, the pa-
per quoted in this context,  Itti & Baldi (2009)
only investigates the hypothesis that surprising
information attracts attention, not that subjects
act to maximize surprise. Friston et al. (2012, p.
6) clarify the relation between FEP and maxim-
ization of Bayesian surprise:
The term Bayesian surprise can be a bit
confusing because minimizing surprise per
se  (or  maximizing  model  evidence)  in-
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volves keeping Bayesian surprise (complex-
ity) as small as possible. This paradox can
be resolved here by noting that agents ex-
pect  Bayesian  surprise  to  be  maximized
and then acting to minimize their surprise,
given what they expect.
In the following section, I will clarify the notion
of falsification, and discuss the ways in which it
is used in PP. More specifically, I will illustrate
various types of active inference by drawing a
slightly broader analogy with theory of science.
In particular, I will consider views put forward
by  Karl  Popper  and  Thomas  Kuhn,  respect-
ively. This will serve to help us get a handle on
the general merits of confirmation and discon-
firmation. Furthermore, both Popper’s falsifica-
tionism and Kuhn’s paradigm change can be re-
lated to aspects of predictive processing, which
will hopefully lead to a better understanding of
hypothesis-testing  in  PP. As a consequence,  I
invite Seth to provide a refined treatment of the
relation  between falsification  and active  infer-
ence.
3 Is the Bayesian brain Kuhnian or 
Popperian?5
The  free-energy  principle  subsumes  the
Bayesian brain hypothesis6 (cf.  Friston 2009, p.
294). According to this view, processing in the
brain can usefully be described as Bayesian in-
ference. This means that the brain implements
a probabilistic model that is updated in light of
sensory signals using Bayes’ theorem. More spe-
cifically,  the  brain  combines  prior  knowledge
about hidden causes in the world with a meas-
urement of  likelihood describing how probable
the observed (sensory) evidence is, given various
possible hidden causes. The result is a distribu-
tion  (posterior)  that  describes  how  probable
various possible causes are, given the obtained
evidence. The process of determining the pos-
5 It should be noted that Popper rejected interpretations of confirma-
tion  (or  corroboration)  in  terms  of  probabilities  (cf.  Popper
2005[1934], ch. X), as well as Bayesian interpretations of probability
theory (cf. Popper 2005[1934], ch. *XVII). Here, I only suggest that
a  useful  analogy  between  Popper’s  theory  of  science  and  the
Bayesian brain can be drawn.
6 Seth identifies PP and the Bayesian brain (cf. p. 1). I follow suit in
this commentary.
terior is often called  model inversion. In FEP,
this  type  of  inference  is  approximated  using
variational Bayes, which establishes the connec-
tion  to  predictive  processing  (cf.  footnote  2
above). FEP can thus either be seen as a partic-
ular instance of the Bayesian brain hypothesis,
or as a generalization.
As  mentioned  above,  it  is  often  pointed
out that perceptions in PP are analogous to sci-
entific hypotheses. The Bayesian brain is thus a
hypothesis-testing brain (this analogy is also re-
ferred to in titles of papers by Jakob Hohwy, see
Hohwy 2010, 2012). Thanks to active inference,
the Bayesian brain performs an active kind of
hypothesis testing. The three types of active in-
ference distinguished by Seth assign a role  to
both confirmation and disconfirmation (falsific-
ation). This dual role of active inference is also
emphasized by (Friston et al. 2012, p. 19):
The resulting active or embodied inference
means that not only can we regard percep-
tion  as hypotheses,  but  we could  regard
action  as  performing  experiments  that
confirm or disconfirm those hypotheses.
Further exploration of the analogy to theory of
science reveals a puzzle: as we will see, doubts
can be raised regarding the idea that a theory
gains merit when it  is  confirmed (or even re-
garding the very notion of theory confirmation).
Does this mean that the Bayesian brain gener-
ates hypotheses in an unscientific way? 
3.1 The Popperian Bayesian brain
3.1.1 Conceptual clarification: From naïve 
to sophisticated falsificationism
According to Popper, science advances mainly
by seeking falsifying evidence. In fact, falsifiabil-
ity is Popper’s proposed solution to the demarc-
ation  problem,  i.e.,  the  problem of  specifying
the difference between science and pseudo-sci-
ence. Scientific theories posit universal proposi-
tions (scientific laws) that can never be proven
in a  strict  sense,  because  only  finite  observa-
tions can be made. The next observation could,
in principle, always disconfirm a universal em-
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pirical hypothesis. Hence, being verifiable can-
not be a criterion for being scientific, because
theories cannot be empirically verified (cf. Pop-
per 2005[1934],  pp.  16-17.).  Conversely,  it  is
possible to falsify a universal statement using a
single empirical proposition:
Diese  Überlegungen  legen  den  Gedanken
nahe,  als  Abgrenzungskriterium nicht die
Verifizierbarkeit,  sondern  die  Falsifiz-
ierbarkeit des  Systems  vorzuschlagen;  […]
Ein  empirisch-wissenschaftliches  System
muß an der Erfahrung scheitern können.
(Popper 2005[1934], p. 17)7
Scientific  theories  thus  cannot,  according  to
Popper, be verified, but only falsified. However,
when  attempts  to  falsify  a  hypothesis  have
failed, we can say that the theory has been cor-
roborated—which  still  means  that  the  theory
could  be  falsified  in  the  future  (cf.  Popper
2005[1934], ch. X).
How can we apply these ideas to predict-
ive processing? First, we have to find an analo-
gon to scientific theories. I suggest that models
can be treated analogously to theories, because
in  PP,  predictions  or  hypotheses  are  derived
from models and then compared to bottom-up
signals. This also fits the way in which Seth de-
scribes the starfish example (namely in terms of
model  selection).  What  does  it  mean  that  a
model is falsified in PP?
The question is not a trivial one, as there
seems to be a crucial disanalogy between hypo-
thesis-testing in Popper’s sense and hypothesis-
testing in the Bayesian brain. The reason why
scientific theories are falsifiable is that they al-
low  deriving  hypotheses  deductively.  This
means if a hypothesis is falsified, the theory is
falsified as well. By contrast, hypotheses in the
Bayesian brain are not deductively entailed by
the models from which they are derived: the re-
lation between model and hypothesis is probab-
ilistic (the hypothesis is more or less probable,
given the model). Hence, when a hypothesis or
prediction elicits  a large prediction error,  this
7 “These considerations suggest proposing not verifiability, but falsifiability
as a demarcation criterion; […] An empirical-scientific system must be
able to break down in the light of empirical evidence.” (My translation)
does not falsify the model; rather, it calls for an
update  to  the  effect  that  the  model  becomes
less likely. Furthermore, according to Popper, it
does  not  make  sense  to  say  that  such  hypo-
theses are corroborated to a greater or lesser ex-
tent.  For  being  corroborated  means  that  at-
tempts at falsification have failed. But if it is in
principle impossible to falsify a hypothesis, then
saying that it  has been corroborated becomes
empty—worse,  such  hypotheses  are  not  even
scientific hypotheses (cf. Popper 2005[1934], pp.
248-249.).  This,  then,  constitutes  the  puzzle
mentioned above: if hypotheses in PP are not
falsifiable, does this mean the Bayesian brain is
unscientific?
This conclusion—that no useful analogy to
Popper’s theory of science can be drawn—rests
on a naïve understanding of falsification (as em-
phasized by Imre Lakatos, cf. Lakatos 1970).8 A
closer look at the notion of falsification reveals
that the analogy can be upheld. Furthermore, it
helps us gain a better grasp of  the notion of
falsification in the context of PP.
First of all, we can note that in actual sci-
entific practice, it is not the case that scientists
attempt to falsify an isolated, single hypothesis
—and then try to come up with a new theory
when the hypothesis has been falsified. Rather,
scientists often operate with different versions of
a theory at the same time, or seek to find the
best parameters for a model. The outcomes of
an empirical study are then used to eliminate
some  of  the  different  theories  or  parameter
ranges. This has already been acknowledged by
Popper (cf.  2005[1934],  p.  63.,  fn.  10).  As
Thomas Nickles puts it:
According  to  Popper,  at  any  time  there
may be several  competing theories  being
proposed  and  subsequently  refuted  by
failed empirical tests—rather like balloons
being launched and then shot down, one
by one. (2014)
The result of this falsification procedure is that
some of the competing theories are eliminated.
This can already be seen as a slight departure
8 I am grateful to Thomas Metzinger for pointing me to Lakatos’ work
on falsificationism.
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from what Imre Lakatos calls naïve falsification-
ism: for the elimination may be based on a com-
parison, not on an isolated falsification proced-
ure. If some of the theories are in some sense
better than the others (for instance, by making
more  empirical  predictions,  or  by  being  less
complex),  then they can be preferred without
having independent reasons to reject the elimin-
ated theories. However, Popper’s falsificationism
is even more sophisticated.
Popper noted that there were no theory-
neutral  empirical  propositions.  Descriptions  of
empirical facts are not immediately given, they
are based on observations and involve interpret-
ations  (cf.  Popper 2005[1934],  p.  84,  fn.  32).
This means it is always possible to add auxili-
ary hypotheses to a theory, and thereby make
the theory compatible with seemingly falsifying
evidence. As a consequence, when it comes to
determining  whether  a  theory  is  scientific  or
not, we cannot consider an isolated theory, but
must assume a diachronic stance, in which we
consider how a theory is modified in the light of
new evidence. Such modifications (e.g.,  auxili-
ary hypotheses) increase the empirical content
of  the  theory  (cf.  Lakatos 1970,  p.  183).  As
Popper puts it:
Bezüglich  der  Hilfshypothesen  setzen  wir
fest, nur solche als befriedigend zuzulassen,
durch  deren  Einführung  der  ‘Falsifizier-
ungsgrad’ des Systems […] nicht herabge-
setzt,  sondern  gesteigert  wird;  in  diesem
Fall  bedeutet  die  Einführung  der  Hypo-
these eine Verbesserung: Das System ver-
bietet  mehr  als  vorher.9 (Popper
2005[1934], p. 58)
When confronted with evidence that contradicts
predictions, we are thus never forced to reject
the theory from which the prediction has been
derived. We may always modify the theory. But
this modification must not be ad hoc. Auxiliary
hypotheses that only make the theory compat-
ible with the evidence, without having any addi-
9 “Regarding such auxiliary hypotheses we stipulate that we allow only
those hypotheses for which the ‘degree of falsifiability’ of the system
is not decreased, but increased; in this case the introduction of auxil-
iary hypotheses means an improvement: The system prohibits more
than before.” (My translation)
tional value (without allowing new predictions),
are not scientific.
Lakatos (1970)  emphasizes  that  this  en-
tails a refined notion of falsificationism. He calls
this sophisticated falsificationism (or sophistic-
ated  methodological falsificationism).  A theory
can  only  be  falsified  in  this  “sophisticated”
manner when it has been replaced by a theory
that:
1. has more empirical content (makes new pre-
dictions), and
2. makes at least one prediction that is empiric-
ally corroborated (cf. Lakatos 1970, pp. 183-
184.).
3.1.2 Sophisticated falsification in the 
Bayesian brain
Popper’s  sophisticated  falsificationism10 can
more easily be applied to predictive processing,
because  it  does  not  require  that  we  reject  a
model whenever its predictions yield large pre-
diction errors.  Instead,  the model  can be  up-
dated to achieve a better fit with the data. Fur-
thermore, we find a counterpart for the insight
that  there  are  no  theory-neutral  observations:
bottom-up  signals  are  never  treated  as  raw
data, but as being (more or less) noisy. Hence,
prediction errors are weighted by expected pre-
cisions.  When  the  expected  precision  is  ex-
tremely  low,  prediction  errors  will  be  attenu-
ated. A low expected precision can thus be seen
as  analogous  to  an  auxiliary  hypothesis  that
makes  the  model  compatible  with  otherwise
contradicting evidence. What is more, it is not
an ad hoc move, because the precision estimate
itself is also constantly being updated in light of
the evidence. Similarly, when a model generates
a significant amount of prediction error, but is
strongly supported by a higher-level model with
high prior probability, a relatively high amount
of prediction error may not lead to a major re-
vision of the model.
10 Lakatos (1970)  points  out  that  Popper  himself  never  made  a
sharp  distinction  between  naïve  and  sophisticated  falsification-
ism, but that he accepted the assumptions underlying sophistic-
ated falsificationism, at least in parts of his work—whereas the
person Karl Popper may have been more of a naïve than a soph-
isticated falsificationist. 
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Model competition in PP can also be seen
as an instance of sophisticated falsificationism.
Competition need not be resolved by eliminat-
ing those models that yield the largest predic-
tion errors (as in the starfish robot). Instead, it
may be that some models make more specific
counterfactual predictions. Indeed, this seems to
be the main rationale behind active inference in
FEP.
According to the formalization provided in
Friston et al. (2012, p. 4), active inference in-
volves minimizing the entropy of a counterfac-
tual density. This density links future internal
states  and  hidden  controls  to  hidden  states,
which cause sensory states; hidden controls are
hidden states  that  can  be  changed  by action
(Friston et al. 2012, p. 3). A density has low en-
tropy, roughly, if it assigns high values to a rel-
atively small subset of states, and low values to
most other sets of states. Predictions based on a
probability density with very low entropy can
thus be made with a high level of confidence,
because most other possibilities are more or less
ruled  out  (due  to  the  low values  assigned to
them by the density). Formally, this is reflected
in the proposition that the negative entropy of
the counterfactual density is a monotonic func-
tion  of  the  precision  of  counterfactual  beliefs
(Friston et al. 2012, p. 4).
The entropy of the counterfactual density
is minimized with respect to hidden controls. In
effect,  this  is  a  selection  process,  in  which  a
model (here: a counterfactual density) is selec-
ted that has minimal entropy. The other models
are  eliminated,  because  they  have  higher  en-
tropies.  We  can  say  they  are  falsified  in  the
sense of sophisticated falsificationism (but not
in the sense of naïve falsificationism).
Another way in which model competition
can be resolved without naïve falsification can
be  illustrated  by  the  famous  “wet  lawn”  ex-
ample (cf. Pearl 1988). Suppose you enter your
garden and find that the lawn is wet. There are
at least two models that can explain this: either
your sprinkler has been on during the night or
it has rained. Let us assume that both models
are initially  equally likely (i.e.,  they have the
same prior probability). When you now observe
that your neighbor’s garden is also wet, the rain
model  is  corroborated,  because  it  makes  the
strong  prediction  that  the  neighbor’s  lawn  is
wet  (i.e.,  the  conditional  probability  that  the
neighbor’s lawn is wet, given that it has rained,
is high). The other model is not incompatible
with this evidence, but it is not supported by it
as  much  (because  the  conditional  probability
that the neighbor’s lawn is wet, given that your
sprinkler has been on, is not as high). In other
words,  it  has  been  explained  away.  As  Jakob
Hohwy puts it:
The Rain model accounts for all the evid-
ence  leaving  no  evidence  behind  for  the
Sprinkler model to explain. Even though
the Sprinkler model did increase its prob-
ability in the light of the first observation,
it  seems  intuitive  right  to  say  that  its
probability  is  now  returned  to  near  its
prior value. The model has been explained
away. (2010, p. 137)
Explaining away is another example of sophist-
icated  falsification.  Even  when  two  or  more
models are compatible with the evidence (and
with each other), there can be reason to prefer
one of them and reject the others.
The  clarification  in  this  section  should
have shown that there is  more to falsification
than  just  “disconfirming”  a  hypothesis,  and
that  competition  between  models  can  be  re-
solved in different ways, not only in the way ex-
emplified  by  the  starfish  robot.  Furthermore,
different  types  of  sophisticated falsificationism
are part and parcel of predictive processing.
Does this mean that the Bayesian brain is
Popperian?  This  conclusion  would  be  prema-
ture. The above can at best show that there are
many situations in which the Bayesian brain is
a sophisticated falsificationist. But there may be
situations in which not even sophisticated falsi-
fication is possible or necessary. In the following
section, I will argue that predictive processing
also has Kuhnian aspects.
3.2 The Kuhnian Bayesian brain
According to Kuhn, scientific research develops
in different recurring phases. Most of the time,
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scientists work within an established paradigm,
in which implications of  theories  are explored
and puzzles are solved (cf. Kuhn 1962, ch. IV).
In  this  phase,  falsification  or  confirmation  do
not play a role:
Normal science does and must continually
strive to bring theory and fact into closer
agreement, and that activity can easily be
seen as testing or as a search for confirma-
tion or falsification. Instead, its object is
to solve a puzzle for whose very existence
the validity of the paradigm must be as-
sumed. Failure to achieve a solution dis-
credits only the scientist and not the the-
ory. (cf. Kuhn 1962, p. 80)
At  some stage,  however,  there  will  be  anom-
alies, i.e., empirical observations that cannot be
explained within  the current  paradigm.  When
these anomalies  accumulate,  scientists  will  try
to explore new concepts and methods. If, using
new  concepts  and  methods,  previously  unex-
plainable anomalies can be accounted for, a sci-
entific  revolution  can result,  through which  a
new paradigm is established. Kuhn shares the
sophisticated falsificationist’s insight that theor-
ies are never rejected in isolation:
[…] the act of judgment that leads scient-
ists to reject a previously accepted theory
is always based upon more than a compar-
ison of  that  theory with the world.  The
decision to reject one paradigm is always
simultaneously the decision to accept an-
other,  and the judgment leading to that
decision  involves  the comparison of  both
paradigms  with  nature  and with  each
other. (cf. Kuhn 1962, p. 77)
This shows that Kuhn’s theory is in some re-
spects in line with sophisticated falsificationism
—but he goes beyond it, in that he doubts that
a paradigm that  has been adopted instead of
another is always better or closer to the truth.
The reason for this is that he claims competing
paradigms to be incommensurable (cf. also Fey-
erabend 1962), which means that they typically
use radically different concepts and methods (cf.
Oberheim & Hoyningen-Huene 2013, §1). A new
paradigm that  becomes  dominant  is  thus  not
marked by being closer to the truth, but mainly
by  constituting  a  departure  from  the  old
paradigm (cf.  Kuhn 1962,  pp.  170-171).  This
seems to entail that scientific progress need not
be a process in which theories approximate the
truth to an ever higher degree.
Can we find an analogon for such a trans-
ition from one paradigm to the other in predict-
ive processing? Above, we saw that the sophist-
icated falsificationist assumes that scientific pro-
gress happens only when a theory makes new
predictions, and thereby leads to the discovery
of new states of affairs. This need not always be
the case in the Bayesian brain. When a model is
changed to minimize free-energy, this does not
mean that the empirical  content or predictive
power has been increased. A particularly clear
example of this can be found in perceptual phe-
nomena like binocular rivalry.
In  binocular  rivalry  (cf.  Blake &
Logothetis 2002),  subjects  are  presented  with
two different  images,  one to the  left  eye,  the
other to the right eye, e.g., a face and a house.
According to a  predictive  coding  account  put
forward by Jakob Hohwy, Andreas Roepstorff &
Karl Friston (2008),  the  brain  generates  two
main competing models of what the stimuli de-
pict,  one corresponding to the face,  the other
corresponding to the house. However, only one
of  these  models  is  consciously  experienced  at
any given time (although there can be intermit-
tent  phases in  which subjects  report  seeing  a
mixture of both stimuli, i.e., parts of the house
and parts of the face at the same time, but usu-
ally  non-overlapping).  This  means  that  the
brain will tend to settle into one of two classes
of states (one corresponding to perceiving the
house, the other to perceiving the face). Since
each of the models can only account for part of
the  visual  input,  both  cause  a  significant
amount  of  prediction  error  (cf.  Hohwy et  al.
2008, p. 691). Over time, the prior probability
of the currently assumed model (house or face,
respectively) will decrease, leading to a revision
of the hypothesis, until the brain settles into a
state  corresponding  to  the  other  percept,  at
least  temporarily  (cf.  Hohwy et  al. 2008,  pp.
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692–694).11 The crucial difference between this
and cases like the wet lawn example or model
selection in the starfish robot is that neither of
the two competing models is in any sense better
than the other (in terms of empirical content,
simplicity, predictive power, etc.).
We can recast binocular rivalry in terms
of Kuhnian paradigm changes. If we liken each
of the two models (house/face) to a paradigm,
we can say that perceiving a single object in
binocular rivalry corresponds to the phase of
normal  science,  in  which  many  phenomena
(inputs)  can  be  explained.  After  some time,
however, there are anomalies (increasing pre-
diction error), which leads to a scientific crisis
in  which  new  directions  are  explored  (inter-
mittent phase in which no unified percept is
generated), until a new form of scientific prac-
tice becomes dominant (scientific revolution),
and a new phase of normal science (temporar-
ily  stable  perception)  is  reached.  The  trans-
ition from one percept to the other does not
go along with increased veridicality: neither of
the two percepts  is  closer  to  the truth than
the other.12 This may also support the cyber-
netic idea that internal models are used in the
pursuit  of  homeostasis,  not  to  approximate
the truth (as also noted by  Seth this collec-
tion, p. 15).
There  is  another  analogy  between  the
Bayesian  brain  and Kuhn’s  theory of  science.
According to Kuhn, it is indeterminate whether
an anomaly (an unexpected experimental result,
for  instance)  is  something  that  should  be  re-
garded as just another puzzle or as a reason to
reject the whole paradigm:
11 Two  possible  reasons  why  the  probability  of  the  currently  as-
sumed model decreases are offered by the authors: either there is
a hyper-prior to the effect that the world changes (which is why
a static  hypothesis  becomes less  likely  over time),  or  there  are
random effects that lead to multistability, such that neural  dy-
namics switch from one basin of attraction to another (cf. Hohwy
et al. 2008, p. 692).
12 In  fact,  it  seems  that  the  notion  of  incommensurability  has
been  inspired  by  Gestalt  switches  (as  in  the  perception  of  a
Neckar cube), which are very similar to phenomena like binocu-
lar rivalry. However, Kuhn explicitly pointed out that there is a
crucial  difference  between  a  Gestalt  switch  and  a  paradigm
change: “[…] the scientist does not preserve the gestalt subject’s
freedom to switch back and forth between ways of seeing. Nev-
ertheless, the switch of gestalt, particularly because it is today
so familiar, is a useful elementary prototype for what occurs in
full-scale paradigm shift” (1962, p. 85). I am grateful to Sascha
Fink for drawing my attention to this statement.
Excepting  those  that  are  exclusively  in-
strumental, every problem that normal sci-
ence sees as a puzzle can be seen, from an-
other viewpoint, as a counterinstance and
thus as a source of crisis. (Kuhn 1962, p.
79)
If it is treated as a puzzle, it yields questions
like: how can we account for this phenomenon
within  our  established  framework?  If  it  is
treated  as  a  counterinstance,  a  more  funda-
mental solution is needed. This is analogous to
the fact that whether two models in predictive
processing  are  compatible  or  not  depends  on
(hyper)priors (cf.  FitzGerald et al. 2014, p. 2).
When a hyper-prior has it that two models are
incompatible, this can either lead to a competi-
tion, in which one of the models is eliminated,
or it can lead to a revision of the hyper-prior.
(Which  of  the  two  possibilities  corresponds
more to puzzle solving, and which to something
more fundamental will depend on whether the
lower-level  models  or  the  high-level  prior  ini-
tially have a higher probability.) This is illus-
trated by the RHI (rubber hand illusion).
In the RHI (Botvinick & Cohen 1998), the
brain harbors two contradictory sensory models.
According to the visual model, tactile stimula-
tion occurs on the surface of the rubber hand.
According to the proprioceptive model, the felt
strokes occur at a different location (i.e., where
the real hand is located). While there is, in and
of itself, no contradiction between these models,
it is likely that the brain has a prior that favors
common-cause explanations of  sensory signals.
Relative to this prior, there is a tension between
the models: they seem to indicate that the seen
stroking and the felt touch occur at distinct loc-
ations,  which is odd, because they occur syn-
chronously (and the prior has it that synchron-
ous effects have a common cause, which speaks
against two distinct locations). As Jakob Hohwy
puts it:
[...]  we  have  a  strong  expectation  that
there is a common cause when inputs co-
occur in time. This makes the binding hy-
pothesis  of  the  rubber  hand  scenario  a
better explainer, and its higher likelihood
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promotes it to determine perceptual infer-
ence  and  thereby  resolve  the  ambiguity.
(2013, p. 105)
Notice that the common-cause hypothesis (that
the touch is felt where it is seen) only becomes
the dominating hypothesis because the design of
the study prevents subjects from confirming the
distinct-causes  hypothesis  (e.g.,  by  looking  at
their real hands). Because of the common-cause
hypothesis,  there  is  an  ambiguity  in  the  per-
cepts. This ambiguity can be resolved in at least
two  ways:  either  by  adjusting  the  lower-level
(perceptual) models (to the effect that the felt
touch occurs at the same location as the seen
stroking); or by active inference (which in this
case would lead to a rejection of the higher-level
model corresponding to the common-cause hy-
pothesis). The first way corresponds to puzzle
solving, the second more closely to a paradigm
change.  Note  that  the  analogy  will  be  the
stronger  the  more  remote  the  hyper-prior  is
from the perceptual models.
I  hope to have shown that the Bayesian
brain has aspects  that  make it  Popperian,  as
well as aspects that make it Kuhnian. At the
very  least,  it  should  have  become  clear  that
falsification is a more complex concept than de-
picted in Seth’s target paper (which seems to
tend towards a more naïve form of falsification-
ism).
4 Perceptual presence
We have seen how fruitful analogies between PP
and  theory  of  science  can  be.  As  mentioned
above,  an  early  formulation  of  the  analogy
between perception and hypothesis-testing can
be  found in  Richard  Gregory’s  seminal  paper
“Perceptions  as  Hypotheses”.  There,  we  also
find the suggestion that percepts  explain sens-
ory signals (cf. Gregory 1980, p. 13).13
How far can we take the analogy between
explanation in perception and explanation in
science? If we know what a good explanation
is in science, does this give us a clue to the
conditions  under  which  percepts  are  experi-
13 It  should  be  noted  that  Gregory ascribes  “far  less  explanatory
power” (1980, p. 196) to perceptions than to scientific hypotheses.
enced as real? Interestingly, there are accounts
of scientific explanation that assign an essen-
tial  role  to  counterfactual  knowledge  (cf.
Waskan 2008).  If  someone purports  to  know
why a certain event happened or why a phe-
nomenon was observed, we expect her to also
be able to tell us what would have happened if
some of the initial conditions had been differ-
ent.  Similarly,  when  the  Bayesian  brain  ex-
plains sensory signals by inferring their hidden
causes, we would expect the brain’s generative
model  to  also  have  the  resources  to infer  in
what ways sensory signals would be different,
had  there  been  a  change  to  their  hidden
causes.
This highlights the relevance of counter-
factual models. Seth points out that counter-
factuals play a crucial role in active inference.
The consideration above may be another way
to show the relevance of counterfactual mod-
els. Furthermore, it also highlights the useful-
ness  of  counterfactual  richness.  The richer  a
counterfactual  model  of  hidden  causes,  the
better the brain’s explanation of sensory sig-
nals (all other things being equal). In general,
we may also be inclined to say that the richer
the counterfactual model, the higher the con-
fidence that it helps track the real explanation
of sensory signals. But does this mean it goes
along with experienced realness (or perceptual
presence)?
This is,  basically,  what Seth proposes in
his PP account of perceptual presence (cf. Seth
2014). But what is perceptual presence in the
first place? On the one hand, Seth characterizes
the  notion  by  contrasting  examples.  For  in-
stance, objects like a tomato possess perceptual
presence,  whereas afterimages do not.  On the
other hand, Seth provides the following charac-
terization:
In  normal  circumstances  perceptual  con-
tent is characterized by subjective veridic-
ality; that is, the objects of perception are
experienced  as  real,  as  belonging  to  the
world. When we perceive the tomato we
perceive it as an externally existing object
with a back and sides, not simply as a spe-
cific view […]. (2014, p. 98)
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The tomato is not perceived as a flat, red disc.
Although you do not see the back and sides of
the tomato in the same way that you see the
front, there is  still  a sense in which both are
perceptually  present (cf.  Noë 2006,  p.  414).  I
shall now point to two ambiguities in Seth’s de-
scription of the explanandum. This calls for a
conceptual clarification, regarding which I shall
make a tentative suggestion. After that, I shall
argue  that  there  may  be  possible  counter-
examples to Seth’s hypothesis  that perceptual
presence correlates with the counterfactual rich-
ness of generative models.
4.1 Ambiguities in Seth’s description of 
the explanandum
The tomato is not only experienced as percep-
tually present, it is also perceived as an  object
in the external world. In a commentary on Seth,
Tom Froese (2014, p. 126) has therefore sugges-
ted that Seth conflates perceptual presence with
experienced objecthood. This proposal has some
plausibility, because the tomato is perceived as
a real object, whereas afterimages are not ex-
perienced  as  objects  (they  are  more  like  un-
stable colored shades). After all, even Seth ad-
mits,  in his target paper, that it may be im-
portant to distinguish presence from objecthood
(p. 18). This is one way in which Seth’s defini-
tion of the explanatory target is ambiguous: is
it  about  experienced  presence  or  experienced
objecthood (cf. also Seth 2014, pp. 105f.)? (This
question becomes more pressing still  when we
consider the ethymology of “realness” or “real-
ity”: the Latin origin of the word is res (thing),
which  makes  it  a  little  confusing  that  Seth
seems to identify perceptual presence with the
sense of subjective reality, cf.  Seth this collec-
tion, p. 2.)
Another ambiguity is related to the notion
of a counterfactual model. In his target paper
Seth defines a counterfactual model as a model
encoding “how sensory inputs (and their expec-
ted precisions) would change on the basis of a
repertoire of possible actions” (Seth this collec-
tion p. 17). On the one hand, one may ask if
counterfactual  models  in  the  brain necessarily
encode SMCs (sensorimotor contingencies). For
the perception of a ripe tomato on a bush, it
might be equally relevant to encode how sens-
ory  signals  pertaining  to  the  tomato  would
change if the wind were to blow the bush or if
the  tomato  were  to  fall  down.  On  the  other
hand, it is unclear how explicit a counterfactual
representation has to be.  Jakob Hohwy (2014)
suggests that a rich causal structure could be
modeled  by  extracting  higher-order  invariants
(features that do not change if  the tomato is
dangling in the wind or has fallen down, for in-
stance).  Higher-order  invariants  are  relatively
perspective-independent.14 The degree of percep-
tual  presence  would  then  correspond  to  the
“depth of the inverted model”15 (Hohwy 2014, p.
128). In his target paper, Seth notes that the
depth of the model may indeed play a role (see
footnote 13).
Two ambiguities are thus to be found in
Seth’s account. One concerns the characteriza-
tion  of  the  target  phenomenon  (experienced
realness versus  experienced  objecthood).  The
other lies in the description of the represented
causal structure:  counterfactual richness versus
perspective-independence of  hidden  causes.
Counterfactual richness and causal “depth” are
not completely independent. Below, I will give
some examples that may be useful to explore
the  relationship  between  these  two  features.
Furthermore,  I  will  suggest  that  it  could  be
helpful to consider another feature with respect
to which the represented causal structure of ob-
jects  may vary.  This  feature  is  the  degree  of
14 As I am using the term here, the depth of a model can be measured
by  its  location  in  the  predictive  processing  hierarchy  (that  is,
whether it is high or low in the hierarchy). Estimates at higher levels
track features that change more slowly (i.e., features that remain in-
variant when things change, for instance, when the subject changes
her  perspective on  a  perceptual  object  like  a  tomato  by  walking
around the tomato or by turning it—hence the term “perspective-
(in)dependence”). A model of a perceived object is deep when it rep-
resents  features  that  change  relatively  slowly.  Alternatively,  one
could stipulate that a model is deep when it represents features that
change slowly  and features that change more quickly. In fact, this
may come closer to what Hohwy has in mind, but it blurs the dis-
tinction between perspective-dependence and causal integration. Ho-
hwy writes: “[c]oncurrents are causes that do not interact on their
own with other causes (presumably a fence won’t occlude a concur-
rent)” (2014, p. 128). But encapsulated causes can be represented
both at lower parts of the hierarchy (possible example: afterimages)
and at higher parts of the hierarchy (possible example: certain con-
scious thoughts). This suggests that at least causal encapsulation can
be dissociated from perspective-dependence and -independence.
15 The inverted model is the posterior distribution, the computation of
which is based on the likelihood and the prior (see above).
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causal  encapsulation.  For  representations  not
only differ with respect to their counterfactual
richness or their degree of perspective-depend-
ence,  but  also  with  respect  to  the  extent  to
which the represented causal structure is encap-
sulated or integrated. (In what follows,  I  will
use the notion of a counterfactual model mainly
in the sense in which Seth uses it: counterfac-
tual models in this sense involve representations
of possible bodily actions by the subject of ex-
perience.)
A phenomenal representation of a tomato
on a plate is not only counterfactually rich and
relatively  perspective-dependent,  the  represen-
ted causal structure is also causally integrated.16
It is, for instance, represented as being causally
related to the plate, because it is experienced as
lying  on the plate (that is, it  is  not hovering
above it). Furthermore, it is in possible causal
contact with virtually all other objects in its vi-
cinity (e.g., the subject’s hands).
Contrast this with the experience of what
is happening in a classical video game—say, a
racing game. The player influences how the im-
ages on the two-dimensional screen change, be-
cause she has control over the vehicle. Hence,
we can assume that representations of gaming
sequences are (usually) counterfactually rich. At
the  same  time,  they  are  also  perspective  de-
pendent (although they mainly depend on the
virtual perspective from which objects are rep-
resented in the game). However, virtual objects
in the game are experienced as causally encap-
sulated: although objects can interact with each
other in the virtual world, they do not interact
with most other parts of the player’s environ-
ment. For instance, they will never break out of
the screen and fly around in the room in which
the player is sitting. Furthermore, they can only
be influenced vicariously through a controller or
keyboard. Thus there is  not causal encapsula-
tion in  every respect (the virtual world is not
experienced as completely disambiguated from
the rest of the experienced world), but in some
respects the encapsulation is rather strong (the
16 Another possible term for this would be causally open, in the sense
that  it  is  represented as  being  in  potential  causal  exchange  with
other objects in its surrounding. By integration, I thus do not mean
integration  within (or  internal  integration),  but  integration  with
other objects.
virtual world is spatially bounded, e.g., with the
screen  as the limit).  Note that  many modern
video games are less causally encapsulated, for
instance when they are played on a touchscreen
(or on devices with a three-dimensional screen,
or in an immersive virtual reality).17
As  mentioned  above,  causal  integration
and counterfactual richness are not completely
independent.  High  counterfactual  richness  im-
plies a certain degree of causal integration (at
least  in  some respects),  for  it  means  that  at
least the subject can interact with the experi-
enced  object  in  some  way—regardless  of  how
separate  the  represented  causal  structure  is
from the rest of the subject’s surroundings.
Similarly, highly perspective-invariant rep-
resentations typically also involve the represent-
ation of an encapsulated causal structure. Ab-
stract conscious thoughts, for instance, cannot
be touched with the hand or other concrete ob-
jects. However, the implied encapsulation only
holds in some respects. Sometimes thoughts can
evoke strong emotions or a sequence of mental
imagery.  In  certain  obsessive-compulsive  dis-
orders,  for  instance,  subjects  will  first  have a
thought  (“My  hands  are  dirty”),  presumably
followed by a feeling of disgust and the urge to
wash the hands, which then leads to motor be-
havior (washing the hands); this, in turn, may
be followed by the thought that the hands are
still dirty. The content of the conscious thought
is relatively perspective-invariant, and yet it in-
volves,  presumably,  representations  of  causal
structure that link it to concrete objects in the
world.
As  long  as  we  interpret  counterfactuals
only as representations of sensorimotor contin-
gencies,  it  may also seem that  perspective-in-
variant18 representations  are  counterfactually
poor. However, if we include representations of
possible mental actions and their effects, we can
also conceive of  counterfactually-rich perspect-
ive-invariant  representations.  A  possible  ex-
ample is a philosophical argument or a theory,
which someone can contemplate in their mind,
being aware that there are several possible ways
17 Thanks to Jennifer Windt for suggesting immersive video games as a
further example.
18 Perspective-invariant representations are maximally perspective-independent.
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in which the argument could be probed and at-
tacked, or several important cases to which the
theory could be applied.
Bearing in mind that the degree of causal
encapsulation is not completely independent from
the other two dimensions (counterfactual richness
and perspective-invariance), we can depict differ-
ent  types  of  conscious  experiences  in  a  cube,
where the three axes stand for the three dimen-
sions described (see Figure 1). The most interest-
ing locations in this cube are, of course, its eight
corners, because they depict classes of experiences
for which each of the three features is either com-
pletely absent or maximally pronounced. Finding
examples  of  these “extremal experiences”  is  no
easy task.19 Even neural representations of synes-
thetic concurrents, Seth’s prime example of coun-
19 In fact, it may be that the corners only constitute hypothet-
ical  endpoints.  Thanks  to  Jennifer  Windt  for  pointing  this
out.
terfactually poor models, may, at first sight, seem
to be located somewhere in the middle of the per-
spective-dependence axis.
Grapheme-color  concurrents,  for  in-
stance,  are  not  simply  triggered  by  graphic
representations of glyphes, but by representa-
tions of abstract objects, i.e., graphemes, asso-
ciated with certain glyphes (cf. Mroczko et al.
2009).  Hence,  it  may  seem  that  the  hidden
cause of the concurrent is not simply an ob-
ject in the world, but also involves an abstract
object, i.e., a grapheme, the representation of
which  is  perspective-invariant.  This  would
suggest  that  synesthetic  concurrents  cannot
conclusively  be  placed  in  one  of  the  cube’s
corners,  because  their  represented  hidden
causes involve very high-level invariants.
On the other hand, one could object that
the concurrent itself is represented in a rather
perspective-dependent way. It may be part of a
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Figure 1: The figure illustrates how classes of experiences can be located in a cube, according to the extent to which
they display counterfactual richness, perspective-independence, and causal integration (see main text for explanations).
The cube (without the labels) is adapted from cube figures in Godfrey-Smith (2009); talks by Daniel Dennett brought
this style of illustration to my attention.
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causal network involving hidden causes that are
represented  in  perspective-invariant  ways,  but
the synesthetic percept itself is not a represent-
ation of an abstract hidden cause.20 Hence, on
second thought, it seems that concurrents, as in
grapheme-color synesthesia, are in fact located
close to the origin of our coordinate system: the
representations involved are relatively perspect-
ive  dependent,  and  they  are  counterfactually
poor. At the same time, they are causally en-
capsulated, because they do not interact with
physical objects (they cannot be touched, etc.).
4.2 Does counterfactual richness 
correlate with perceptual presence (or
objecthood)? 
What does this tell us about experienced “pres-
ence”  or  “objecthood”?  Are  all  examples  of
counterfactually rich representations in the cube
perceptually  present,  or  are  they  associated
with a high degree  of  objecthood? If  so,  this
would support Seth’s hypothesis that counter-
factual richness correlates with perceptual pres-
ence (or objecthood). I believe that counterfac-
tual richness can be dissociated both from per-
ceptual presence and from objecthood. Olfact-
ory  experiences  are,  as  argued  by  Michael
Madary (2014), both counterfactually poor and
perceptually present.  This suggests that coun-
terfactual richness does not correlate with per-
ceptual presence. Similarly, experiences of clas-
sical video game sequences are counterfactually
rich,  but  involve  a  low  degree  of  perceptual
presence; objects in the game are only experi-
enced  as  virtual  objects,  not  as  real  objects.
Counterfactual richness and perceptual presence
may therefore be doubly dissociable.
Trying to evaluate whether counterfactual
richness correlates with phenomenal objecthood
would presuppose that we know what phenom-
enal objecthood means. As I only have an intu-
itive grasp of what it means, I can only give a
preliminary statement. To me, it seems that vir-
tual objects in two-dimensional video games do
not possess a high degree of phenomenal object-
hood. But then again, even if a virtual tomato
20 This may point to an aspect regarding which Hohwy‘s characteriza-
tion of causal depth is ambiguous.
could be  manipulated in  various  ways with a
controller,  the  corresponding  representation
would probably not be as counterfactually rich
as a representation corresponding to the experi-
ence of a real tomato. Hence, it is difficult to
arrive at a definitive verdict.
A more promising path may involve  the
experience of objects in asomatic OBEs (out-of-
body  experiences)  or  asomatic  dream  experi-
ences (Windt 2010;  Metzinger 2013). Counter-
factuals, as conceived of by Seth, always involve
action on the part of a subject. Most, if not all,
(non-mental) actions involve the body, so rep-
resenting  counterfactuals  involves  representing
(parts of) the body. In asomatic OBEs and aso-
matic  dream  experiences,  subjects  do  not
identify with a body, but with an unextended
point in space. I speculate that in such cases,
representations of objects are less counterfactu-
ally rich.21 This, however, does not necessarily
mean that they are experienced as less present
or as possessing less objecthood. There are still
a lot of causal regularities involving external ob-
jects  that  may  be  tracked  by  models  in  the
brain, even in the absence of an ordinary body
representation.  External  objects  can  interact
with each other, and counterfactual representa-
tions of possible causal processes may contrib-
ute to the experience of objecthood or percep-
tual presence. In particular, this is to be expec-
ted if none of the external objects are represen-
ted as causally encapsulated. If this bears out,
it provides another reason to believe that coun-
terfactual  richness  of  generative  models  does
not correlate with experienced objecthood. Let
us now consider possible examples of other ex-
tremal experiences (in the corners of the cube)
to investigate whether it is plausible to hypo-
thesize that represented causal depth or causal
encapsulation  correlates  with  perceptual  pres-
ence or objecthood.
The  more  perspective-invariant  a  repres-
entation,  the  more  abstract  it  is.  This  also
means that perspective-invariant representations
typically involve an encapsulated causal struc-
ture.  Thinking  about  a  simple  equation  like
21 In fact, asomatic OBEs may be a better example than asomatic dream ex-
periences, since such dreams typically lack concrete objects (cf. LaBerge &
DeGracia 2000). I am grateful to Jennifer Windt for pointing this out.
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“1+1=2” may be an example of this. There is
no way in which the target of this representa-
tion can causally interact with the window be-
hind my desk or the red bottle in front of the
window.  Furthermore,  most  (or  all)  bodily
movements will not influence the way I experi-
ence the thought that one plus one equals two.
Hence,  it  is  arguably  also  a  counterfactually
poor representation. 
When  we  move  up,  in  the  direction  of
counterfactually  rich  phenomenal  representa-
tions,  we  arrive  at  representations  that  are
counterfactually rich, perspective-invariant, and
still causally encapsulated. Above, I mentioned
conscious  thoughts  about  philosophical  argu-
ments  or  theories  as  possible  examples.  Such
thoughts may involve mental imagery and inner
speech, and perhaps even complex phenomenal
simulations involving counterfactual situations.
It is not obvious whether it makes sense to say
that such thoughts involve counterfactual rep-
resentations linking possible mental actions to
their effects. This is even harder without pre-
supposing a developed theory of mental action
(for  recent  proposals,  cf.  Proust 2013;  Wu
2013).
Mental actions are goal-directed. Perform-
ing a mental action may therefore, at least in
some cases, be followed by a representation of a
situation in which the goal is realized (one pos-
sible example might be: remembering a name;
represented  situation:  telling  someone  the
name). In the case of a theory, a mental action
could be considering whether a certain claim is
true or  not  (or  whether  it  is  plausible).  This
may trigger thoughts like: “Assuming this is the
case,  what  implications  would  this  have?  Are
these  implications  plausible,  or  likely  to  be
true? Are there  possible  counterexamples?”  It
might  also  involve  trying  to  formulate  some-
thing more clearly.
Furthermore, thinking about a theory or
problem  may  involve  conscious  counterfactual
thoughts of the form “If I gave up this assump-
tion, there would not be a contradiction among
the remaining hypotheses anymore”, or “If the
theory  could  account  for  this  special  case,  it
would be strengthened”. One difference to con-
scious perception of concrete objects is, presum-
ably, that such counterfactuals are  phenomen-
ally represented,  whereas  representations  of
SMCs are usually unconscious (and may impact
on consciousness only indirectly).
Similar things apply to conscious thoughts
about non-trivial mathematical expressions. For
instance, if a mathematician sees the expression
(1 + x/n)n she will probably think “If  n tends
to infinity, this expression will  converge to  ex.
Now, suppose the mathematician is investigat-
ing the asymptotic  behavior  of  some complic-
ated  expression  (e.g.,  she  wants  to  find  out
what happens to a certain expression when  n
tends to infinity). While manipulating the terms
on paper, she suddenly realizes that one factor
contained  in  the  expression  is  (1 + x/n)n.  As
she is using pen and paper while thinking this,
her brain will not only activate an abstract (but
conscious) counterfactual thought, but probably
also a representation of SMCs. These SMCs will
involve taking the limit of the expression with
which she started (i.e.,  lim n→∞), and this is
now not only a mental action, but also a pos-
sible bodily action. She could write this down,
and know that (if  the limit exists)  part of  it
would  be  ex.  Her  mathematical  investigation
therefore involves:
• phenomenal  representations  regarding  coun-
terfactual mental actions;
• representations  of  SMCs (embodied versions
of the above mentioned counterfactuals);
• a close coupling between writing, perceiving,
and thinking.
The third point is especially important, because
it  suggests  that  for  a  mathematician  working
with pen and paper (or chalk and blackboard)
the objects  of  her conscious thoughts are not
causally  encapsulated  anymore.  The  causal
structure represented while thinking about ab-
stract  concepts is  intertwined with the causal
structure represented while  looking at  written
mathematical  expressions.  These  causal  rela-
tions are still relatively limited, but if the math-
ematician is completely absorbed in her work,
the paper (or blackboard) may be all she is at-
tending to in her environment at the moment,
perhaps to the extent that she does not experi-
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ence abstract relations represented by her notes
as causally encapsulated anymore. It is conceiv-
able that this aspect can be enhanced in virtual
environments in which mathematical objects are
not represented by writing on paper or black-
board, but by three-dimensional virtual objects
that can be manipulated by touch or manual
movements, for instance.22 Contrary to what one
might at first think, there may thus be cases in
which high-degrees of perspective-invariance go
along  with  both  counterfactual  richness  and
high degrees of causal integration.
Another  class  of  abstract  thoughts  that
may be experienced as causally integrated could
be obsessive thoughts, like the thought that one’s
hands  are  contaminated  with  germs.  Such
thoughts  may  be  triggered  by  specific  events
(like touching a door knob) and may go along
with a fear of getting sick (because of the con-
tamination).  Subjects  may  also  try  to  avoid
touching objects that they fear might be contam-
inated. The reason for this is  that the hidden
cause represented by the obsessive thought, i.e.,
potential germ contamination, is not causally en-
capsulated. It is causally connected to concrete
objects in the subjects’ environment: things that
are perceived as contaminated can cause a con-
tamination of the hands; on the other hand, con-
taminated hands can infect other objects with
germs.  Furthermore,  the  inferred  hidden cause
(germ contamination) is relatively perspective-in-
variant. Subjects arguably do not imagine bac-
teria crawling on their hands, although the ob-
sessive  thought may go along with  an  altered
perception of the hands. Finally, the model in-
volved is probably counterfactually poor, as most
actions do not change the alleged contamination
(with  the  possible  exception  of  washing  the
hands  or  touching  allegedly  contaminated  ob-
jects; but here, the counterfactual effect is prob-
ably just an increase or decrease in the acuteness
of the felt contamination). Therefore, I list ob-
sessive thoughts as candidate examples of coun-
terfactually  poor,  perspective-invariant  repres-
entations the contents of which are represented
as causally integrated.
22 This could be a case in which there is a particularly strong demand for
the general ability of PP to combine “fast and frugal solutions” with
“more structured, knowledge-intensive strategies” (Clark this collection).
4.3 Do perspective-invariance or 
represented causal integration 
correlate with perceptual presence (or
objecthood)?
The examples given are certainly not uncontro-
versial and perhaps not all of them can be sus-
tained  in  the  light  of  further  research.  But
hopefully the cube can still fulfill heuristic pur-
poses, and can illustrate the need to clarify the
relations  between counterfactual  richness,  per-
spective-dependence,  and  causal  integration.
But assuming that the examples given are loc-
ated  in  roughly  the  right  places  within  the
cube, what does this tell  us about perceptual
presence  or  experienced  objecthood? Above,  I
dismissed Seth’s hypothesis that counterfactual
richness correlates with either presence or ob-
jecthood. Let us now briefly consider perspect-
ive-invariance  and  causal  integration.  If  con-
scious  thoughts  involve  causally-deep  models
(that  represent  perspective-invariant  features),
then it seems that the depth of the represented
causal  structure does  not  correlate  with pres-
ence or objecthood. The thought that one plus
one equals two does not possess a high degree of
objecthood  or  perceptual  presence.  Hence,  it
seems that Hohwy’s hypothesis that the depth
of the generative model (the degree of perspect-
ive-independence) correlates with objecthood or
presence should be dismissed as well.  But the
remaining  candidate,  causal  integration,  does
not unequivocally correlate with either presence
of  objecthood  (if the  examples  I  gave  make
sense). The represented causal structure in ob-
sessive thoughts need not be encapsulated, and
still they are probably not accompanied by ex-
perienced  objecthood  or  perceptual  presence.
Perhaps this shows that one ought first to cla-
rify whether it even makes sense to talk about
the  phenomenology  of  objecthood  or  presence
with respect to conscious thoughts.
4.4 How does perception change when 
new sensorimotor contingencies are 
learnt?
Another relevant question is whether increasing
the degree of counterfactual richness, causal integ-
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ration, or causal depth of a model just modifies
(or  enriches)  the  inferred  hidden  causes,  or
whether it leads to the perception of a new, pos-
sibly more abstract  object.  This  relates  to  the
question  raised  in  the  target  paper,  namely
whether a person who is highly familiar with an
object perceives it as more real (because she has
mastery of more SMCs) than other persons (Seth
this collection, p. 18). Interestingly, research on
learning new SMCs tentatively suggests that it
leads to the perception of new (more abstract)
objects.
Under the lead of Peter König, cognitive sci-
entists from Osnabrück have, in recent years, de-
veloped a compass belt that indicates to the per-
son wearing it (while moving) changes in direc-
tions (cf.  Kaspar et al. 2014). The aim of this
project (called feelspace) is to study how percep-
tion in new sensory modalities can be enabled by
sensory augmentation.23 The belt (see  Figure 2)
contains several vibrators, which always signal the
direction of magnetic north. Subjects who wear
the belt for a couple of weeks learn new SMCs,
e.g., related to how the vibrating signals change
when they turn around. A straightforward applic-
ation of  Seth’s PPSMCT suggests that the in-
creased counterfactual richness simply goes along
with  an  increased  perceptual  presence  (for  the
belt, or the vibrations, or the hip / waist, etc).
But the authors of the study cited report that
perception changes in different ways:
Initially the signal was predominantly per-
ceived as tactile evolving to being perceived
as location and direction information. Over
time,  the perception of  tactile  stimulation
receded  more  and  more  into  the  back-
ground.  Instead  the  subjects’  reports  fo-
cused more on changes in spatial perception.
Furthermore, two months after the end of
belt wearing the effects subjects reported –
at least in the FRS questionnaire – dimin-
ished. (Kaspar et al. 2014, p. 59)
What changes is not just that SMCs for
tactile stimulation on the skin where the belt is
worn are learnt, but that these are connected to
23 For more information on the project, see: http://feelspace.cogsci.uni-
osnabrueck.de/ 
more  abstract  information  (regarding  location
and direction). This also makes sense in com-
parison  with  other  sensory  modalities.  Know-
ledge of auditory SMCs, for instance, does not
increase the perception of the inner ear. When
the brain learns the relevant SMCs, it thereby
learns about the hidden causes of signals in the
inner ear. In fact, this may be another reason to
believe that counterfactual richness goes along
with phenomenal objecthood.
This  also  suggests  that  when  someone  is
more  familiar  with  an  object,  the  object  itself
need not become more real, but its connections to
other objects might. The causal network in which
it is embedded becomes more real. Perhaps the
subject  also  experiences  more  abstract  objects
(corresponding to higher-level invariants).
All in all, I hope the examples given illus-
trate the need to provide a conceptually clearer
account of counterfactual richness, causal depth,
and  causal  integration.  For  at  the  moment  it
seems that they are too entangled to allow us to
assess  their  potential  relevance  for  experienced
objecthood or presence in a rigorous way. Fur-
thermore,  it  will  be  crucial  to  investigate  how
phenomenal  properties  are  affected  when  there
are  changes in these three features (e.g.,  when
counterfactual richness or causal integration is in-
creased  or  decreased  in  a  controlled  way in  a
study).
5 Conclusion
I  have  tried  to  show  that  useful  analogies
between PP accounts and classical ideas in the-
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Figure 2: The figure shows two versions of the feelspace
belt. (a) The original version used in Nagel et al. (2005).
(b) The current version used in Karcher et al. (2012) and
Kaspar et al. (2014). Images used with kind permission of
Peter König.
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ory  of  science  run  deeper  than  portrayed  in
Seth’s target paper. Based on such analogies, I
have argued that a proper treatment of active
inference needs to be more sophisticated than
Seth’s threefold distinction. In particular, Seth
blurs a whole range of  ways in which models
can be falsified.
Furthermore, I have suggested that Seth’s
predictive  processing  account  of  perceptual
presence  may profit  from taking  not  just  the
counterfactual  richness  of  generative  models,
but also their degree of perspective-dependence
and their causal encapsulation into account (as
mentioned above, this suggestion is inspired by
Jakob Hohwy’s work). I have proposed a way in
which  examples  of  possible  combinations  of
these features can be explored, which may serve
as a useful tool for future research.
Thomas Kuhn (1962,  p.  88)  writes  that
“normal  science  usually  holds  creative  philo-
sophy at arm’s length, and probably for good
reasons”. I thus hope that research on predictive
processing  and  consciousness  has  not  yet
reached  the  phase  of  normal  science,  so  that
this commentary can still make a humble con-
tribution.
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